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1 .O INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PURPOSE 
This technical basis document was developed to support the documented safety analysis (DSA) 
and describes the risk binning process and the technical basis for assigning risk bins for natural 
event hazard (NEH)-initiated accidents. The purpose of the risk binning process is to determine 
the need for safety-significant structures, systems, and components (SSC) and technical safety 
requirement (TSR)-level controls for a given representative accident or represented hazardous 
conditions based on an evaluation of the frequency and consequence. Note that the risk binning 
process is not applied to facility workers, because all facility worker hazardous conditions are 
considered for safety-significant SSCs and/or TSR-level controls (see RPP-14286, Facility 
Worker Technical Basis Document). Determination of the need for safety-class SSCs was 
performed in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94, Preparation Guide for US. Department of 
Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, as described below. 
1.2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
1.2.1 Representative Accidents 
NEH identified in the hazard evaluation database include: 
b 
b 
b 
e 
b 
b 
b 
Lightning 
High winds (including wind-generated missiles)’ 
Earthquakes (seismic events) 
Flooding (natural)’ 
Extreme temperatures (e.g., freezing) 
Volcanic ashfal13 
Snow loads 
Dust stormddust devils 
Hail storms 
Range fires! 
NEH are initiators of hazardous conditions as identified in the hazard evaluation database. 
Table 1 identifies which NEH are initiators of particular representative accidents. 
There are no specific representative accidents for NEH. 
’ Tornados are beyond design basis accidents for the Hanford Site. 
Columbia River flooding in the Hanford 200 Areas is a beyond design basis event, 
Volcanic eruption (i.e., flow of molten lava) is a beyond design basis event for the Hanford Site. 
‘ Range fires wiIl be identified as an ‘‘external event” in the DSA. 
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Table 1 .  Representative AccidentlNatural Event Hazards Initiator Matrix. 
M 
C 
C 
M 
.- 
2 
3 
X 
Release from contaminated facility 
Tank failure due to excessive loads 
Aboveground sttucture failure 
Waste transfer leak 
X 
Unplanned excavatioddrilling I 
X 
X 
X 
- 
- 
X 
X - 
1.2.2 Bounding Offsite Accidents 
Offsite radiological consequences for all accidents initiated by natural events are bounded by the 
calculated consequences for the following representative accidents: 
Flammable gas 
Waste transfer leak. 
Tank failure due to excessive loads 
Calculations performed for these three representative accidents show that the offsite radiological 
consequences are 
7 rem for the bounding flammable gas accident, as presented in the following documents: 
1 rem for tank failures due to excessive loads and waste transfer leaks, and 
RPP-I 2395, Wsite Radiological Consequence Analysis for the Bounding Tank Failure 
Due to Excessive Loads Accident 
RPP-13470, Offsite Radiological Consequence Analysis for the Bounding Flammable 
Gas Accident 
RPP-14499, Wsi te  Radiological Consequence Analysis for the Waste Transfer Leak. 
Potential failure modes of single-shell tanks (SST) and double-shell tanks (DST) induced by 
seismic events are described in WHC-SD-TWR-RPT-002, Structural Integrity and Potential 
Failure Modes of the Hanfurd High-Level Waste Tanks (see Section 5.6, “Beyond Design Basis 
Earthquakes”). The expected failure modes of SSTs and DSTs for seismic events are similar to 
(200-series SSTs) or bounded by (1 00-series SSTs and DSTs) the tank dome collapse postulated 
2 
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for tank failure due to excessive concentrated loads in RPP-12395. That is, for significant 
seismic events: 
200-series SSTs - The flat roof is assumed to collapse and result in a hole on top of the 
tank. 
100-series SSTs - The failure mode of the tank structure is likely a localized area with 
deep cracks in the wall near the footing resulting in some failure in the liner in the same 
general location. Dome cracking on the inner and outer face would occur, but no 
continuous, large, through-the-thickness cracking is expected. Some spalling may occur 
on the inner wall. 
DSTs - The failure mode would be localized. Cracks would develop in the dome, wall, 
and footing. The primary tank would remain intact at the dome. No open crack failure is 
predicted in the dome. Possible leak at weld cracks of primary tank at the bottom and 
comers. 
The DELPHI expert panel also evaluated the tank structure of SSTs and DSTs for seismic loads 
and their findings are similar to the above (WHC-SD-TWR-WT-003, DELPHIExpert Panel 
Evaluation of Hanford High Level Waste Tank Failure Modes and Release Quantities). See also 
RF'P-WT-26718, Dome Load Collapse Assessment for Hanford Double- and Single-Shell Tanks. 
The only unique aspect of natural events is the potential of NEH to cause multiple (Le., common 
cause) failures. The natural event postulated to result in the highest consequences is a design 
(evaluation) basis earthquake that causes the uncontrolled releases of radioactive and other 
hazardous material from multiple accidents, which could include flammable gas accidents, tank 
failures due to seismic loads, and waste transfer leaks. The bounding unmitigated analysis of a 
design basis earthquake concluded that the potential offsite radiological consequences would not 
challenge the 25 rem Evaluation Guideline (DOE-STD-3009-94, Appendix A), and, therefore, no 
safety-class SSCs are required to protect the offsite public from the radiological consequences of 
natural events. The bases for this conclusion, which are also applicable for the evaluation of 
onsite radiological and offsite and onsite toxicological consequences, are: 
Although a natural event (e.g., design basis earthquake or high wind) may cause multiple 
accidents (e.g., flammable gas accidents, tank failures), it is not reasonable to expect that 
all of the releases would be the highest estimated release for the individual accidents. 
That is, there would be a range of consequences below the reasonably conservative 
consequences estimated for each individual accident. 
The offsite and onsite radiological and toxicological exposures fiom the multiple 
accidents are not additive because the accidents occur at different locations within the 
tank fanns. That is, a hypothetical maximally-exposed offsite individual (MOI) at the 
Hanford Site boundary and a hypothetical onsite worker at 100 m will not receive the 
maximum exposure estimated from every release location. 
For these reasons, the risk binning team also judged that even if natural events initiated multiple 
accidents, any cumulative effect would not increase the consequence level (see Section 1.3) for 
3 
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the MOI (toxicological) or onsite worker (100 m) (radiological and toxicological) and, therefore, 
no additional controls (safety SSCs and TSRs) are required. 
1.2.3 Associated Hazardous Conditions 
Potential hazardous conditions initiated by NEH are included under other representative 
accidents. 
1.3 RISK BINNING METHODOLOGY 
Direction on risk binning was provided by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of River 
Protection (OW) (Klein and Schepens, 2003, “Replacement of Previous Guidance Provided by 
RL and OW’). Risk binning begins with a qualitative evaluation of the frequency and 
consequences of the representative accident. Frequency is qualitatively estimated as 
“anticipated,” “unlikely,” “extremely unlikely,” or “beyond extremely unlikely.” Consequences 
are evaluated for the following receptors and exposures: offsite toxicological, onsite radiological, 
and onsite toxicological. These consequences are assigned to one of three levels: high, 
moderate, or low. Based on the frequency and consequence, risk bins (ranging from I to IV) are 
assigned. Tables 2 and 3 show the criteria for assigning the frequency and consequence levels, 
and the risk bins, which are assigned to the various combinations of frequency and consequence. 
Afler the risk binning process is completed for the representative accident, the process is then 
repeated for the represented hazardous conditions associated with the representative accident. 
In accordance with the control selection guidelines in Klein and Schepens (2003), Risk Bin I 
events require safety-significant SSCs or TSRs, and Risk Bin 11 events must consider 
safety-significant SSCs and TSRs. Risk Bin 111 events are generally protected by the safety 
management programs, and Risk Bin IV events do not require additional measures. Initial DSA 
development was largely completed before Klein and Schepens (2003) was issued and more 
conservative control selection guidelines were used. During the initial DSA development, safety 
SSCs or TSRs were required for accidents or hazardous conditions that were assigned to risk 
bins I or 11, and were considered for accidents or hazardous conditions that were assigned to Risk 
Bin 111. For accidents or hazardous conditions assigned to Risk Bin IV, safety SSCs and TSRs 
were not expected. Safety management programs were acceptable for addressing the residual 
risk posed by Risk Bin IV conditions. 
4 
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- -  
<109yr >lod t o ~ l O " / ~  >lo4 to Zlo-*/yr >IO" to g o ' / y r  
unlikelv unlikely Unlikely Anticipated 
Beyoid extremely Extremely 
Table 2. Offsite (Toxicological Only) Risk Bins. 
Event freauenev 
2100 rem 
>ERpG-3 / TEEG3 
(High) 
z25 to <lo0 rem 
ZERF'G-2 I TEEL-2 to 
<ERpG-3 I TEEL-3 
[Moderate) 
111 
Iv 
I I I I I I ZERPG-2 i TEEL-2 (High) 
ZERPG-1 I TEEL-1 to 
<ERPG-2 I 'EEL-2 
(Moderate) I I1 I11 I 
< ERF'G-1 / TEEL-1 
(LOW) 
Notes: 
Preparution Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nucleur Fucility Documented Safety Analyses, 
Change Notice No. 2, Appendix A, US. Departrnent of Energy, Washington D.C. 
'%adiological consequences for the offsite receptor are evaluated in accordance with DOE-STD-3009-94,2002, 
ERPG = emergency response planning guideline. 
TEEL = Temporary Emergency Exposure Limit. 
Table 3. Onsite (100 m) Risk Bins. 
Beyond extremely 
unlikely 
Consequence level 
(radiological/ 
toxicological) 
<25 rem 
<ERPG-2 / TEEL-2 
(Low) 
Iv 
Notes: 
Event freauenw 
I 
n1 
I 
ERPG = emergency response planning guideline. 
TEEL = Tempomy Emergency Exposure Limit. 
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Environmental consequences are also assigned during the risk binning process. There are four 
levels of environmental consequences (EO, El, E2, and E3, in order of increasing severity) and 
these levels are defined in Table 4. 
Table 4. Environmental Conseauence Levels. 
I Category I Definition I 
E3 
E2 I Significant discharge onsite 
1 Offsite discharge or discharge to groundwater 
El 1 Localized discharge 
Eo I NO significant environmental consequence 
2.0 RISK BINNING RESULTS 
A risk binning team meeting was conducted on October 1,2002, to obtain consensus on the 
identification of NEH initiators of hazards and the assignment of frequencies, consequences, and 
risk bins. The attendees represented a wide range of expertise in the areas of engineering, 
licensing, and operations, and included representatives from the OW. Appendix A lists the 
attendees and the organization each attendee represents. After the meeting, the risk binning 
results were distributed to the Technical Working Group (TWG) for review and concurrence. 
The risk binning results, including subsequent revisions, are shown in Table 5. 
2.1 NATURAL EVENT HAZARD FREQUENCIES 
NEH that can initiate a representative accident are discussed in the sections that follow except 
for flooding. Columbia River flooding in the 200 Areas is a beyond design basis event. The 
hquencies reported are those that were used in the NEH risk binning meeting to determine the 
frequencies of the NEH-initiated representative accidents. 
2.1.1 Lightning 
Lightning has an assigned frequency of “anticipated,” based on the average Hanford lightning 
strike hquency of 0.16 lightning strikes/mi2/yr (WC-SD-WM-ES-387, Probability, 
Consequences, and Mitigation for Lightning Strikes to Hanford Site High-Level Waste Tanks). 
6 
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Table 5. Summary of Results for Representative Accidents for Natural Event Hazards-Initiated 
Accidents (Without Control$ 
Postulated accidenthazardous condition 
Flammable gas - natural event (lightning or seismic event) 
ienites flammable eases in SST” 
Flammable gas - natural event causes flamnmble gas 
release and ignites gases in SST‘ 
Flammable gas - natural event fails DST active primary 
ventilation system resulting in steady-state flammable gas 
hazard 
rank failure due to excessive loads - seismic event causes 
structural failure of an SST or DST 
Waste transfer leak - seismic event causes fine spray 
waste leak 
Waste transfer leak- freezing causes large uim break 
Frequency 
U 
U 
U 
U 
. U  
A 
Conseauenees I Risk bin 
I I I 
Notes: 
Risk Bin 111. 
Tor DSTs, the consequences and risk bins are the same except for onsite radiological which are “low” and 
A = anticipated 
H = high. 
L = low. 
M = d e r a t e .  
U = unlikely. 
DST = double-shell tank. 
SST = single-shell tank. 
2.1.2 High Winds 
High winds have assigned fr;equencies of “anticipated” for winds high enough to cause some 
accidents such as a crane dropping its load or tearing a flex receiver bag, and “unlikely” for the 
design-basis performance category (PC)-2 event (DOE-STD-1020-2002, Natural Phenomena 
Hazards Design and Evaluation CPiteria for Department of Energy Facilities) that could cause 
structural failures (e.g., 242-T Evaporator Building failure). 
The “unlikely” wind is similar to a PC-2-level event, and is based on the annual probability of 
exceedance, 1 OT2; the “three-second gust” wind velocity is 91 mih  (DOE-STD-1020-2002). 
There are no wind-generated missile criteria for PC-2. 
7 
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2.1.3 Seismic Events 
Seismic events have assigned frequencies of “anticipated” for an event large enough to create an 
ignition source or to cause some accidents such as a crane dropping its load, and “unlikely” for 
the design basis PC-2 event (DOE-STD-1020-2002) that could cause structural failures (e.g., 
SSTJDST dome collapse). 
The “unlikely” seismic event is similar to a PC-2 event. The earthquake load requirement for 
PC-2 is to follow International Building Code Seismic Use Group 111 - 213 Maximum Considered 
Earthquake ground motion with an Importance Factor of 1.5. Based on the 2,500 year return 
period for the maximum considered earthquake, the frequency of seismically-induced accidents 
is “unlikely.” 
2.1.4 Extreme Temperatures 
Extreme temperatures (e.g., freezing) have an assigned frequency of “anticipated” because they 
have occurred and will most likely continue to occur at Hanford. 
2.1.5 Volcanic Ashfall 
Volcanic ashfall has an assigned frequency of “unlikely” for the design basis PC-2 event. 
The “unlikely” volcanic ashfall is similar to a PC-2 event and is based on the annual probability 
of exceedance, lo”; the design basis ashfall loading is 5 lb/ft2 (WHC-SD-GN-ER-30038, 
Volcano Ashfall Loads for the Hanford Site). 
2.1.6 Snow Load 
Snow loading has an assigned frequency of “unlikely.” The design basis snow loading is 
15 Iblf? (TFC-ENG-STD-06, Design Loads for Tank Farm Facilities). 
8 
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2.2 CONSEQUENCE DETERMINATION 
2.2.1 Assignment of Consequence Levels for the 
Onsite Receptors 
Consequence levels in Table 5 for representative accidents for the NEH-initiated accidents are 
assigned in the applicable representative accident technical basis documents: 
RPP-12444, Technical Basis for the Tank Failure Due to Excessive Loads Representative 
Accident and Associated Represented Hazardous Conditions 
RPP-135 10, Flammable Gas Technical Basis Document 
RPP-13750, Waste Transfa Leaks Technical Basis Document. s 
2.3 NATURAL EVENT REPRESENTED 
HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS 
Potential hazardous conditions initiated by NEH are included under other representative 
accidents. 
3.0 CONTROL SELECTION 
A control decision meeting was held on October 10,2002, to obtain consensus on the 
identification of controls for those NEH-initiated events that result in accidents assigned (without 
controls) to risk bins I or II. The attendees represented a wide range of expertise in the areas of 
engineering, licensing, and operations, and included representatives from the OW. Appendix B 
lists the attendees and the organization each attendee represents. After the meeting, the results 
were distributed to the TWG for review and concurrence. The TWG concurred with the final 
control decision meeting results. In addition, all facility worker hazardous conditions, including 
those assigned to risk bins I11 or IV, were evaluated for controls as documented in RPP-14286. 
For each of the representative accidents considered in this control decision meeting, various 
controls and SSCs were previously selected for the hazardous conditions associated with those 
accidents. When considering controls for NEH-initiated accidents, the control decision meeting 
attendees evaluated if the controls and SSCs previously selected for the individual accidents need 
to be protected &om NEH. The control decision meeting discussions regarding the accidents 
under consideration, and the selected controls for those accidents are summarized in the sections 
that follow. Table 5 identified the frequencies, consequence levels, and risk binning for the 
NEH-initiated representative accidents under consideration. 
9 
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3.1 FLAMMABLE GAS 
There are three flammable gas scenarios considered, as presented in Table 5. 
The first scenario assumes that gases are above the lower flammability limit (LFL), without 
controls, and a deflagration is initiated by lightning or a seismic event. The possible controls 
considered were flammable gas controls applicable to steady-state and gas release events (see 
RPP-135 10). After discussion of possible operational impacts o f  applying the flammable gas 
controls, the control decision meeting participants selected these flammable gas controls as the 
control for this hazard. 
For the seismic-induced gas release eventhpark flammable gas accident, the possible controls 
considered included: 
Emergency preparedness program 
Tankinventory 
Seismic qualifications. 
After discussions relating to the amounts of possible gas releases in SSTs versus DSTs, and if 
any control could be considered effective or even credible, the control decision meeting 
participants selected the emergency preparedness program as the control for this hazard. That is, 
the emergency preparedness program will have seismic response procedures that include 
evacuation of the tank farms to mitigate the consequences of postulated seismically-induced 
flammable gas accidents. 
For the seismic-induced steady-state flammable gas hazard, the possible controls considered 
included: 
Emergency preparedness program 
Limiting condition for operation (LCO) on DST ventilation systems 
Seismic qualification of DST ventilation systems. 
After discussions of the true effect of barometric breathing in DSTs, the times to LFL given no 
ventilation or only barometric breathing, and the true frequency of this event, the control 
decision meeting participants selected the following as controls for this event: 
An LCO on the DST ventilation systems, involving a surveillance requirement on 
flammable gas concentration in DSTs without a hnctioning primary ventilation system 
Emergency preparedness program. 
Seismic qualification of DST ventilation systems was not selected as a control since this 
requirement is not necessary to meet the DST primary ventilation system safety function to 
maintain the concentration of flammable gases from steady-state releases below the LFL in the 
DST headspace. That is, the DST primary ventilation system is not required to be operating 
during or immediately after a significant seismic event. Based on estimates of flammable gas 
generation rates and accumulation in the headspace of DSTs, the minimum time required to the 
LFL in the DST headspace is more than one month conservatively assuming no ventilation 
10 
Page 20 of 36 of DA03128267 
RPP-13938 REV 2 
(WP-5926, Steady-State Flammable Gas Release Rate Calculation and Lower Flammability 
Level Evaluation for Hanford Tank Waste). 
3.2 TANK FAILURE DUE TO EXCESSIVE 
LOADS 
There is one tank failure due to excessive loads scenario, a seismic-initiated dome collapse, that 
was considered at the control decision meeting (see Table 5 )  
Controls considered for the seismic-initiated dome collapse accident include: 
Emergency preparedness program 
Dome loading controls. 
Designation of tanks as safety-significant SSCs (with associated seismic qualification) 
After discussions regarding the seismic qualification of the tanks and if that qualification could 
be credited as a preventive control, the control decision meeting attendees selected only the 
emergency preparedness program as a control (mitigative) for this accident. That is, the 
emergency preparedness program will have seismic response procedures that include evacuation 
of the tank farms to mitigate the consequences of postulated tank failures due to seismic loads. 
There was considerable discussion regarding this decision because seismic qualification is 
included as part of the intrinsic tank structural integrity required by the designation of the SSTs 
and DSTs as design features in HNF-SD-WM-SAR-067, Tank Farms Final Safe9 Analysis 
Report. A member thought that it was inappropriate to drop the currently in-place seismic 
qualification control (a preventive control) in favor of only a mitigative control. It was suggested 
that this decision is inconsistent with the control selection hierarchy established for the control 
decision process that places preventive controls ahead of mitigative, and engineered features 
ahead of administrative controls. Also, retaining the seismic qualification of the underground 
tanks would seem to be a prudent measure, which could be accomplished by designating the 
seismic qualification of the tanks as a passive design feature protected by the configuration 
management process. It was decided that the potential cost of designating the tanks 
safety-significant (due to the costs required to perform the rigorous certification required, as well 
as the costs of implementing and maintaining the safety-significant “label”) provide no 
significant increase in safety nor any significant reduction in risks by such a designation. 
3.3 WASTE TRANSFER LEAK 
There are two waste transfer leak scenarios considered for controls as presented in Table 5: a 
seismic event-initiated (fine spray) waste transfer leak, and a fieezing-initiated (large pipe) waste 
transfer leak. 
11 
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For the seismic event-initiated (fine spray) waste transfer leak, the potential controls considered 
include: 
Emergency pqaredness pTogram 
Seismically qualified waste transfer leak controls 
Seismic detection and interlock for automatic pump shutdown. 
Cost-benefit ratios of seismically qualifying cover blocks, the times required for tank farm 
operations personnel to obtain information about a seismic event after one occurs, and what 
actions personnel took after the last seismic event were considered. Based on this discussion, the 
control decision meeting participants selected the emergency preparedness plan as the control for 
this event. As with other seismic scenarios, it was judged to be too dificult and costly to 
seismically qualify the amounts of equipment that would be required in the field to implement 
the other possible controls. Therefore, the emergency preparedness program will have seismic 
response procedures that include termination of waste transfers to mitigate the consequences of 
potential waste transfer leak accidents. 
For the freezing-initiated (large pipe) waste transfer leak accident, the potential controls 
considered include: 
0 Waste transfer leak controls 
Freeze protection systems / programs. 
After discussion of heat tracing systems, the control decision meeting participants selected the 
current suite of waste transfer leak controls as controls for this event. 
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